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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are an automotive worker in the Deep South of the 
United States. The automobile factory you work at employs thousands of 
workers, as is common in the region. The plant is owned by a foreign 
manufacturer, which is par for the course as well. You work eight to ten 
hours a day and make good wages compared to most people in your state, 
although that depends on whether you are a full-time employee or still 
employed by the temp agency that contracts with the manufacturer. 
At some point during your career, a union drive starts among the 
workforce. As it builds in influence, attention is drawn to hazardous 
working conditions and broken promises by management. Eventually, the 
unionizing effort becomes strong enough to petition for an election to earn 
certification as the collective bargaining representative of you and your co-
workers. If you have not already pledged support for the union, its 
organizers work fervently to win your vote. 
 At this point, plant management takes on a different tone regarding 
the union. Whereas your supervisors may have once been standoffish or at 
most annoyed, now they are outwardly hostile at the idea of unionization. 
You and dozens of other workers are pulled aside for weekly presentations 
that frame your vote as a show of loyalty. Rumors abound that your 
cherished benefits will be lost if a union comes into the workplace, and 
some even worry that the plant will close its doors and flee town for 
cheaper labor. 
 The bitterness of this battle taking place on your employer’s 
doorstep—emulating the final weeks of a presidential campaign in the 
closest of swing states—may not be surprising to you, given that the 
company is defending its territory. But you soon discover that 
management’s message does not stop at the end of your shift. Television 
commercials urge you to “Vote No” on unionization. Local business leaders 
in the state take to the airwaves to warn of labor’s lies and inefficiencies. 
Pro-company signs line the streets and adorn the windows of most of your 
town’s small businesses. Pamphlets arrive daily from vaguely named 
organizations like “Americans for Prosperity,” rife with statistics that decry 
the economic devastation that unions have wrought in northern cities. Most 
jarring of all are the press releases from state politicians in the days before 
the election that promise new assembly lines in return for the union’s defeat 
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or threaten job losses in the event of a victory. By the time you are finally 
ready to fill out a ballot, it is as if the entire community is demanding that 
you maintain the status quo and send the union packing. 
 These are the conditions described by Robert Hathorn, a service 
technician at the Nissan plant in Canton, Mississippi who voted “yes” for 
the United Auto Workers (UAW) but saw the union rejected by almost two-
thirds of his co-workers in August of 2017. Hathorn described the election 
environment as “overwhelming” and the anti-union message as 
“telepathic”:  
I would go to work and get in that shift meeting; a message 
comes on the [in-plant] TV about voting no to the UAW. 
Then the manager says something, then I go to the break 
room and there are slides slandering the UAW. Then you get 
ready to leave and they hand out literature about voting 
against the union. I leave work and up and down the 
highway you see Vote No signs. You see billboards talking 
about “our team, our future,” you get home and you get 
brochures in the mail, you turn on the television and there it 
was again. Every time you turn on social media it’s there. It 
was overwhelming. That had to get to people.1 
 Much of what Hathorn describes is legal within the confines of 
American labor law. Employers may require employees to attend anti-union 
presentations (innocuously dubbed “captive audience meetings”) during 
working hours without affording the union the same access and 
opportunity.2 Employers have wide latitude to express their views 
                                                      
1 Chris Brooks, Why Did Nissan Workers Vote No?, LABOR NOTES (August 11, 2017), 
http://www.labornotes.org/2017/08/why-did-nissan-workers-vote-no [hereinafter Brooks]. 
2 Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406 (1953) (restoring the “no-equal-
opportunity” rule regarding in-plant captive audience meetings). Employers are granted 
near-dictatorial authority in this setting:  
The employer is entitled to discipline employees who leave the captive 
audience meeting or who insist on participating by asking questions or 
manifesting disagreement with the views being force-fed to them. 
Further, the employer may prevent pro-union employees from attending 
such meetings, deliberately isolating employees from co-workers who 
might be able to rebut the employer’s claims. It is not unprecedented for 
an employer to lock all the exits at the workplace during a captive 
audience meeting and physically restrain those attempting to leave. 
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regardless of the medium through which they communicate them, only 
contravening the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) if these expressions 
contain either a threat of reprisal or force, or a promise of benefit.3 
Generally, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency 
statutorily charged with enforcing the Act, largely refrains from policing the 
veracity of employers’ campaign literature.4 The Board will only set an 
election aside on these grounds if the literature amounts to “forged 
documents” that “render the voters unable to recognize propaganda for what 
it is.”5 Perhaps sensing the soft underbelly of this system, employers have 
expanded their utilization of sophisticated union-avoidance tactics in recent 
decades to increasingly effective results.6 
However, actions undertaken by external forces in organizing drives 
lie on shakier ground. Third parties unrelated to the conflict do not possess 
the explicit speech rights under the NLRA that employers and workers 
enjoy.7 Nonetheless, groups ranging from local citizens to advocacy groups 
to sitting politicians choose to offer their views in elections, deemed 
important to the given region, routinely engaging in impassioned rhetoric 
and prediction-making as to the effects of unionization.8 In a pair of recent 
elections that garnered national attention, these intrusions have surpassed 
                                                                                                                                         
Roger C. Hartley, Freedom Not to Listen: A Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory 
Indoctrination through Workplace Captive Audience Meetings, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 65, 68 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
3 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012).  
4 Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) (“[W]e will no 
longer probe into the truth or falsity of the parties’ campaign statements, and that we will 
not set elections aside on the basis of misleading campaign statements.”). 
5 Id. Perversely, the Midland standard arguably incentivizes union-resistant employers to 
position their campaigns as flagrantly coercive as possible so as to avoid portraying their 
arguments in a deceptive fashion. See id. (“[W]e will set an election aside not because of 
the substance of the representation, but because of the deceptive manner in which it was 
made, a manner which renders employees unable to evaluate the forgery for what it is.”).  
6 See, e.g., Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer 
Opposition to Organizing, E.P.I. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 235 (2009) [hereinafter 
Brofenbrenner]. Bronfenbrenner conducted her study from a random sample of 1,004 
NLRB certifications and from an in-depth survey of 562 campaigns conducted within that 
sample between the years 1999 and 2003. Id. at 1. She found, among other things, that 
employers utilized captive-audience meetings in 89 percent of elections, hired 
“management consultants” in 75 percent of elections, and distributed anti-union literature 
in upwards of 70 percent of elections. Id. at 10, tbl. 3. These tactics greatly reduced the 
union’s chances of winning certification. Id. 
7 See infra notes 77—98 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 99—121 and accompanying text. 
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the point of conjecture and bordered on threats.9 However, because these 
entities technically operate independently from the warring factions, their 
behavior has escaped legal scrutiny despite its potential coerciveness on 
workers’ freedom of choice. 
This article will argue that unions face little hope of prevailing in 
these sort of large-scale campaigns until the Board rules that aggressive, 
anti-union community pressure violates federal labor law. Part I examines 
recent major organizing drives initiated by the United Auto Workers in 
which such community pressure has come to bear upon representation 
elections, detailing the extent of the meddling and the unique threats the 
perpetrators are capable of. Part II introduces case law regarding the 
“laboratory conditions” of Board-officiated elections and analyzes existing 
protections against third-party interference. Part III argues that these 
barriers are wholly inadequate in the modern context of regional anti-union 
blitzkriegs, and it proposes that the laboratory conditions doctrine be 
interpreted to encompass the type of tactics deployed in the UAW’s recent 
defeats if unions are to have any chance at success in large-scale organizing 
campaigns going forward. Part IV concludes the Article by evaluating this 
suggestion against the backdrop of more drastic proposals to reform 
American labor law, concluding that the laboratory conditions doctrine 
needs immediate revisal regardless of other approaches. 
I. ORGANIZING THE SOUTH: A CRASH COURSE IN PROGRESS 
Organized labor in the United States is in an extended state of crisis. 
While unions once represented more than a third of American workers, they 
now represent barely a tenth of the labor market (and less than seven 
percent of the private sector).10 A combination of global market 
economics,11 increased employer resistance to unionizing efforts,12 and 
                                                      
9 See infra notes 30—76 and accompanying text. 
10 Megan Dunn & James Walker, Union Membership In The United States, U.S. DEP’T 
LABOR, (Sept. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-membership-in-the-
united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf.  
11 See Robert E. Scott, Heading South: U.S.-Mexico Trade and Job Displacement After 
NAFTA, E.P.I. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 308 1 (2011) (finding that U.S. trade deficits with 
Mexico had displaced 682,900 U.S. jobs. as of 2010); see also Stephen Eidle, Rust Belt 
Cities and Their Burden of Legacy Costs, MANHATTAN INST. (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/R-SE-1017.pdf (tabulating the loss 
of manufacturing jobs in Rust Belt cities) [hereinafter Eidle].  
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hostile, anti-union government policy13 have decimated membership rolls 
and driven down wages and benefits for union and nonunion workers 
alike.14 Pro-union reforms to the NLRA have died in conference or at the 
hand of Senate filibusters,15 leaving federal labor law largely unchanged for 
over half-a-century.16 Employers have exploited this stagnation through the 
increased utilization of automation, subcontractors, and “temporary” 
workers, effectively turning technological innovation against those seeking 
stable jobs and benefits.17     
To survive in the twenty-first century, unions must organize new 
members to replace those they have lost to aforementioned factors. 
However, vast swaths of the country are essentially walled off from 
sustained organizing efforts. Twenty-seven states18 are currently operating 
under so-called “Right to Work” laws, which prohibit union security-clause 
                                                                                                                                         
12 See Bronfenbrener, supra note 6. For an example of an effective corporate assault upon a 
union’s bargaining power, see Michael H. Cimini, Caterpillar’s Prolonged Dispute Ends, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS (Fall 1998), available 
at https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/caterpillars-prolonged-dispute-ends.pdf (chronicling 
Caterpillar’s resounding win at the bargaining able amidst a series of labor disputes with 
the UAW between 1991 and 1998); James Surowiecki, Caterpillar’s Crawl to Control, 
Slate (Mar. 13, 1998, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/the_motley_fool 
/1998/03/caterpillars_crawl_to_control.html. In the spirit of transparency, my grandfather 
was a longtime member of UAW Local 974 in Peoria, Illinois, the largest local involved in 
the dispute.  
13 See, e.g., Gordon Lafer, Attacks on Public-Sector Workers Hurt Working People and 
Benefit the Wealthy, ECON. POLICY INST. (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.epi.org/publication 
/attacks-on-public-sector-workers-hurt-working-people-and-benefit-the-wealthy/ 
(highlighting the recent evisceration of collective bargaining rights for public-sector 
workers in Iowa and Wisconsin). 
14 See Josh Bivens et al., How Today’s Unions Help Working People: Giving Workers the 
Power to Improve Their Jobs and Unrig the Economy, ECON. POLICY INST. 7-11 (2017).  
15 See Rand Wilson, The Labor Law Reform We Need, LABOR NOTES (July 11, 2012), 
http://www.labornotes.org/2012/07/labor-law-reform-we-need.  
16 See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1527 (2002). 
17 Catherine Rampell, The Rise of Part-Time Work, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Mar. 8, 2013, 
10:51 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/the-rise-of-part-time-work/; 
Noam Scheiber, Plugging Into the Gig Economy, From Home With a Headset, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/business/economy/call-center-gig-
workers.html.  
18 Missouri’s voters overturned their state’s Right to Work law in a state-wide ballot 
referendum in August of 2018 after turning in triple the amount of signatures necessary to 
enact the constitutional blocking mechanism. Noam Schreiber, Missouri Voters Reject 
Anti-Union Law in a Victory for Labor, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/08/07/business/economy/missouri-labor-right-to-work.html. Missouri was set to 
otherwise become the twenty-eighth Right-to-Work state in the union. 
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provisions that enable unions to collect “fair share fees” to cover the costs 
of services and representation. These laws, made possible through one of 
the Taft-Hartley Act’s amendments,19 create an incentive for workers to 
decline paying union dues and become “free riders” of services tied to 
representation. Unions are required by law to represent all employees in the 
bargaining unit equally,20 thus potentially wasting resources on workers 
who do not pay the organization a cent in return.  
But this assumes a union is even extant. The southern states, which 
almost uniformly passed Right-to-Work laws in the first decade of their 
legality, are home to most of the lowest union-density rates in the country.21 
A concomitance of (often circular) economic and social factors lead to 
employer hegemony in the Deep South, including fiscal austerity, 
underinvestment in education, and conservative social policies.22 In light of 
the post-war labor movement’s devastating failure to organize multi-racial 
unions amidst a cacophony of race- and red-baiting business tactics, some 
have dubbed the South’s implacable opposition to labor and minority rights 
“the Southern cage.”23 
As such, it may seem counter-intuitive that today’s unions would 
waste a substantial amount of resources attempting to organize southern 
workplaces. However, if unions are to increase membership and regain 
leverage in collective bargaining, there simply is no avoiding the fastest 
growing region in the country.24 Perpetuating the “race to the bottom” 
                                                      
19 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012). 
20 National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012); accord Steele v. 
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
21 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by 
State, U.S. DEP’T LABOR (displaying union-density rates as 2015-16 annual averages) 
[hereinafter Union Density]. 
22 See Colin Gordon, The Legacy of Taft-Hartley, JACOBIN (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://jacobinmag.com/2017/12/taft-hartley-unions-right-to-work; Ross Eisenbrey, Right-
To-Work Laws: Designed to Hurt Unions and Lower Wages, E.P.I. (Mar. 2, 2015, 3:45 
PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/right-to-work-laws-designed-to-hurt-unions-and-lower-
wages/.  
23 See Rich Yeselson, Fortress Unionism, DEMOCRACY JOURNAL (Summer 2013), 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/29/fortress-unionism/ [hereinafter Yeselson]; see 
also Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the 
New Deal and Fair Deal, 19 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (2005), 
available at http://havenscenter.org/files/southern_imposition.pdf.  
24 U.S. Census Bureau, Population Clock, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, available at 
https://www.census.gov/popclock/data_tables.php?component=growth (last visited Nov. 
14, 2017). 
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socio-economic phenomenon, both domestic and foreign employers have 
increasingly located their manufacturing operations in the low-wage, 
regulatory lax South rather than compete with the higher wage and more 
union-populous northern state economies.25  
Capital is fleeing from unions, and unions have no choice but to 
pursue it—even if the path is treacherous and the chance of success is slim. 
Furthermore, organized labor cannot afford to bide time and fortify its 
position in its northern and Midwestern bases, as even former strongholds 
like Michigan and Wisconsin have passed Right-to-Work legislation under 
recent Republican insurgencies.26 Thus, it is hardly surprising that the 
UAW—one of the unions hardest hit by the global recession and its effect 
upon heavily-organized industries such as auto-manufacturing27—has made 
it a top priority to unionize foreign automakers in the South.28  
A. Volkswagen Chattanooga  
The UAW’s first major target in its southward push was the 1,400-
acre, 3,000-plus employee Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee.29 
The plant, which started production in 2011 and represents a one-billion-
dollar investment by the German automaker,30 was always “the most 
                                                      
25 See generally NORMAN CAULFIELD, NAFTA AND LABOR IN NORTH AMERICA (2011); see 
also Chris Brooks, Money for Nothing, JACOBIN (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/09/vw-subsidies-chattanooga-tn-uaw-autoworkers. Of 
course, the phenomenon of “capital flight” has existed before modern labor law even came 
to be. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: 
Misunderstanding the National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEX. L. REV. 921, 969-70 (1993). 
26 Monica Davey, Unions Suffer Latest Defeat in Midwest With Signing of Wisconsin 
Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/us/gov-scott-
walker-of-wisconsin-signs-right-to-work-bill.html. Moreover, manufacturing jobs continue 
to disappear in private-sector unions’ remaining bastions of strength. See Eidle, supra note 
11. 
27 U.A.W. and the Auto Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com 
/interactive/2015/10/08/business/uaw-auto-union-timeline.html#/#time386_11115 (stating 
that in 2008 UAW membership dropped below 500,000 members for the first time since 
1941, down from a peak of 1.5 million members in 1979). 
28 See Nick Bunkley, U.A.W. to Renew Organizing Efforts at Foreign-Owned Plants, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/business/global/13uaw.html 
(noting the UAW’s plan to portray resisting companies as “human rights violators”).  
29 Chattanooga, VOLKSWAGEN: GROUP OF AMERICA, http://www.volkswagengroup 
america.com/facts.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). 
30 Id. 
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promising prospect” from the union’s perspective.31 Volkswagen was 
known for its uniquely collaborative relationship with Germany’s largest 
trade union, IG Metall, manifested in the form of industry-wide bargaining 
and subsidiary works councils.32 These councils are elected bodies of 
employee representatives that supplement an employer’s union but also 
function independently from the adversarial model of collective 
bargaining.33 The German principle of “codetermination” stipulates that 
employers must obtain approval from employees before making certain 
decisions for the business,34 whereby works councils may exercise 
consenting authority over anything from bonuses to working hours to 
vacation days.35 Such a social partnership is unprecedented in the United 
States, and IG Metall provided substantial advice and support to the UAW 
throughout the organizing process.36 Meanwhile, Volkswagen management 
expressed interest in importing German-styled works councils to 
Chattanooga by way of unionization.37 
                                                      
31 Stephen J. Silvia, The United Auto Workers’ Attempts to Unionize Volkswagen 
Chattanooga, I.L.R. REVIEW 4 (2017) [hereinafter Silvia].  
32 Id. at 4-5. 
33 Id at 5. 
34 Allison Drutchas, An American Works Council: Why It’s Time to Repeal NLRA Section 
8(a)(2), 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 29, 39 (2016). 
35 Id. at 42 (citations omitted). Further, German works councils have notification rights to 
the company’s financial affairs and its decision to terminate a worker’s employment, as 
well as consultation rights to the implementation of new technology in the workplace. Id. at 
43. 
36 Silvia, supra note 31, at 5-6. As Silvia notes, “IG Metall leaders had become 
increasingly concerned that German automakers were diverting production to the United 
States to take advantage of the lower labor costs,” and eventually launched a transnational 
partnership to attempt to reduce the wage disparity. Id. at 5; see also Ryan Breene, UAW 
partners with Germany’s IG Metall to push for better U.S. wages, union representation, 
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Nov. 19, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://www.autonews.com/article/ 
20151119/OEM01/151119780/uaw-partners-with-germanys-ig-metall-to-push-for-better-
u.s.-wages.  
37 Silvia, supra note 31, at 7. The only way to install a works council-type system under 
American labor law is through a unionized workplace. Id. at 6-7. In Electromation, Inc., 
309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), the Board invalidated a set of Japanese-inspired employee 
“Action Committees” at a non-union plant because they were unlawfully “dealing with” the 
employer over items like wages and working conditions and depended on the company for 
financial support in violation of § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which declares it ‘‘an unfair labor 
practice for an employer . . . to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration 
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.’’ However, the 
Board’s opinion suggested that these “quality circle” employee-participation groups are 
permissible if ratified through collective agreement: 
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Suffice it to say, the UAW was confident in its efforts. The union 
claimed in August of 2013 that a majority of employees in the plant had 
signed authorization cards.38 In January of 2014, UAW officials announced 
it had reached an agreement with management to hold a Board-supervised 
election for recognition from February 12 to 14, and the two sides signed an 
official neutrality agreement just weeks before the vote.39 The agreement 
was described as a “dream world” for the union.40 Volkswagen agreed to 
refrain from engaging in the sort of anti-union campaigning now custom for 
American companies, and it provided UAW organizers with a list of names 
and home addresses of its employees.41 Additionally, Volkswagen granted 
the UAW access to its plant for voluntary gatherings and presentations 
before the election while endorsing the German model of works councils 
and employee codetermination rights as the plant’s desired model of labor 
relations.42 In return, the UAW promised that, if elected, initial collective 
bargaining negotiations with Volkswagen would revolve around 
“maintaining the highest standards of quality and productivity” and 
“maintaining and where possible enhancing the cost advantages and other 
competitive advantages that [Volkswagen] enjoys relative to its competitors 
. . . .”43 
The neutrality agreement produced an incredible wave of backlash 
among anti-union forces in the area, which were already loudly outspoken 
against the UAW’s organizing efforts at the Chattanooga plant and had 
                                                                                                                                         
Where there is a labor union on the scene, these employee-management 
cooperative programs may act as a complement to the union. They can 
not, however, lawfully usurp the traditional role of the Union in 
representing the employees in collective bargaining about grievances, 
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of work. 
Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1004 (Oviatt, Member, concurring); see also Dennis M. 
Devaney, Electromation and Du Pont: The Next Generation, 4 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 3, 11-12 (1994). Thus, it is little wonder that Volkswagen and the UAW conditioned 
the implementation of works councils in the plant on the election of the UAW as the 
employees’ collective bargaining representative. See infra note 41.  
38 Silvia, supra note 31, at 9. 
39 Id. at 10. 
40 Brent Snavely, VW, UAW cooperate before election begins, USA TODAY (Feb. 11, 2014, 
7:19 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2014/02/11/volkswagen-uaw-
cooperation-vote/5404223/. 
41 Silvia, supra note 31, at 11. However, the union agreed to forego from making any house 
calls. Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 12. 
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persuaded Volkswagen to resist the union’s request for voluntary 
recognition.44 Grover Norquist’s lobbying organization, Americans for Tax 
Reform, rented a dozen billboards in Chattanooga that visually linked the 
UAW to President Barack Obama and abandoned factories in Detroit.45 
Local papers quoted sources that speculated unionization would prevent the 
plant from obtaining new products for its assembly lines.46 Two prominent 
Tennessee State Republicans, Speaker Pro Tempore Bo Watson and House 
Majority Leader Gerald McCormick, threatened to withhold future state 
subsidies from Volkswagen if its workers voted to unionize.47 A spokesman 
for Republican Governor Bill Haslam stated on the eve of the election that it 
would “become more difficult for Tennessee to recruit new manufacturers 
to the state if the Volkswagen workers are represented by the UAW,”48 and 
urged the workers to vote no on behalf of the governor’s office. 
Most alarming were the actions of United States Senator Bob 
Corker, the former Mayor of Chattanooga. On the first day of voting, 
Corker released the following statement at his local office: “I’ve had 
conversations today and based on those am assured that should the workers 
vote against the UAW, Volkswagen will announce in the coming weeks that 
it will manufacture its new mid-size SUV here in Chattanooga.”49 
Volkswagen management immediately denied any connection between the 
                                                      
44 Id. at 9; Gabe Nelson, 4 Key VW Decisions Shaped Vote’s Course, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS 
(Feb. 22, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20140222/OEM01 
/302249972/4-key-vw-decisions-shaped-votes-course (stating that Volkswagen 
management refused card-check recognition because it was “concerned about antagonizing 
Republican politicians in Tennessee”). Around this time in 2013, the National Right to 
Work Legal Defense Foundation had begun offering free legal assistance to Volkswagen 
employees “who felt intimidated by UAW organizers”, and right-wing lobbying 
organizations—including the Competitive Enterprise Institute and Grover Norquist’s 
Americans for Tax Reform—were carpeting the city with anti-union media. Silvia, supra 
note 31, at 8. 
45 Silvia, supra note 31, at 13. 
46 Id. Don Jackson, the recently-retired president of manufacturing at the Chattanooga 
plant, stated that he didn’t “know that for a fact, but it’s just economics” that the union 
“will not be good” for attracting a new sports utility vehicle line. Mike Pare, Pro-, anti-
UAW activity gears up ahead of VW election, TIMES FREE PRESS (Feb. 8, 2014), 
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2014/feb/09/pro-anti-uaw-activity-gears-
up-ahead-of-vw/131300/.  
47 Silvia, supra note 31, at 14. 
48 Brent Snavely, Tenn. Lawmakers Issue Incentive Threat in VW Union Move, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 11, 2014, 8:50 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/ 
2014/02/11/tennessee-volkswagen-uaw-incentives-threat/5388341/.  
49 Silvia, supra note 31, at 14. 
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outcome of the election and production-related decisions, but Corker 
reiterated his claim about future investment the following day: “After all 
these years and my involvement with Volkswagen, I would not have made 
the statement I made yesterday without being confident it was true and 
factual.”50 Corker’s statements immediately received widespread 
coverage,51 and even prompted a response from Obama before voting had 
officially concluded.52 
On the evening of February 14, 2014, the results of the election were 
announced. With eighty-nine percent of employees participating, 712 voted 
against union representation and 626 voted in favor. The UAW had 
garnered forty-seven percent of the vote—shy of the fiftypercent-plus-one 
necessary to constitute a majority. “I’m thrilled for the employees and 
thrilled for our community,” Corker told the Wall Street Journal that night. 
“I’m sincerely overwhelmed.”53 
On February 21, 2014, the UAW filed objections with the Board, 
alleging coercive third-party interference with the election and urging the 
Board to set aside the results and conduct another secret-ballot election.54 
The union claimed that Tennessee politicians and private groups repeatedly 
                                                      
50 Id. at 14-15. 
51 See, e.g., Bernie Woodall, U.S. Senator Drops Bombshell During VW Plant Union Vote, 
REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2014, 9:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-
corker/u-s-senator-drops-bombshell-during-vw-plant-union-vote-
idUSBREA1C04H20140213.  
52 Ed O’Keefe, Obama Knocks GOP for Fighting Unionization of Tenn. VW Employees, 
WASH.   POST  (Feb.  14,  2014),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/ 
2014/02/14/obama-knocks-gop-for-fighting-unionization-of-tenn-vw-employees/?utm_ 
term=.2b4b12740049. Corker had a confrontational history with organized labor in the 
state prior to his involvement with the UAW’s campaign at Volkswagen, having been 
accused of opposing the Obama’s administration’s American auto-industry bailout on the 
basis that he wanted to break the union’s grip on General Motors in Tennessee and 
elsewhere. See Peter Whoriskey, Anger Grips Auto Workers, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2008/12/12/AR2008121204128.html; Zaid Jilani, Corker Booed By Workers At GM 
Plant Ceremony, Takes Credit For Saving Industry That He Opposed Saving, 
THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 20, 2010, 2:57 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/corker-booed-by-
workers-at-gm-plant-ceremony-takes-credit-for-saving-industry-that-he-opposed-saving-
2efc89229b9a/.  
53 Neal E. Boudette, Union Suffers Big Loss at Tennessee VW Plant, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 
2014, 11:49 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/union-vote-at-volkswagen-tennessee-
plant-heading-to-close-1392379887.  
54 See Volkswagen Grp. of Am. Inc. and UAW, N.L.R.B., No. 10-RM-121704, UAW 
objections filed Feb. 21, 2014, available at http://op.bna.com.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
dlrcases.nsf/r%3FOpen%3dbpen-9gjt8l [hereinafter UAW Objections].  
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threatened the “diminishment of job security if the workers vote for the 
union” until their message “was known to every potential voter in this 
extremely high visibility campaign.”55 But two months later, the UAW 
abruptly announced that it had dropped the charges.56 Most assumed that, 
given the union’s narrow loss, it wished to hold another representation as 
soon as possible rather than bog the plant down in appeals,57 but it was later 
revealed that Volkswagen and the UAW had reached a deal behind the 
scenes. The union agreed to forego any elections in Chattanooga for the 
next two years, while Volkswagen would recognize the UAW on a 
voluntary “members union” basis.58 However, management later reneged on 
this agreement after the UAW successfully organized a smaller unit of 164 
skilled employees in the plant against Volkswagen’s wishes.59   
B. Nissan Canton  
The UAW next set its sights on the sprawling, mile-long Nissan 
plant in Canton, Mississippi that housed over 3,500 hourly workers.60 While 
still smarting from its loss at Volkswagen, Nissan presented the UAW with 
an opportunity to revise its southern organizing strategy. One of the major 
criticisms that emerged from the Chattanooga campaign was that the union 
                                                      
55 Id. at 11. 
56 Steven Greenhouse, U.A.W. Drops Appeal of VW Vote in Tennessee, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/business/auto-workers-union-drops- 
appeal-in-vw-vote.html.  
57 See id. (“[I]f a labor board process included federal court appeals, it could have taken 
two years for an N.L.R.B. decision ordering a new election to take effect.”). Under the 
NLRA, losing unions must wait twelve months to conduct another election. National Labor 
Relations Act § 9(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (2012). 
58 UAW Says Volkswagen Reneged on Deal to Recognize Union, TIMES FREE PRESS (June 
21,  2016),  http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/story/2016/jun/21/ 
uaw-says-volkswagen-reneged-deal-recognize-union/372126/.  
59 See id.; see also Silvia, supra note 31, at 16-23.  The UAW finally petitioned for another 
NLRB election at Volkswagen’s Chattanooga plant in April 2019, narrowly losing 833-
776. Chris Brooks, Why the UAW Lost Again in Chattanooga, LABOR NOTES (June 14, 
2019), https://labornotes.org/2019/06/why-uaw-lost-again-chattanooga. While many 
elements of coercive community pressure were present in this sequel election, such as 
Tennessee Governor Bill Lee’s decisive anti-union efforts, Volkswagen management was 
this time actively opposed to the UAW’s organizing efforts and campaigned stridently 
against unionization of the plant. Id. Any legal analysis of the 2019 campaign thus falls 
outside the scope of this Article. 
60 Noam Scheiber, Racially Charged Nissan Vote Is a Test for U.A.W. in the South, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/business/economy/nissan-
united-auto-workers-mississippi.html [herinafter Scheiber].  
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failed to engage with the local community and mobilize “civil rights, 
church-based, or other civil society groups” until days before the election.61 
In Canton, the UAW made sure to cultivate support from the region’s faith 
leaders and NAACP officials well before the vote while directing its 
messaging campaign—“Worker Rights are Civil Rights”—at Nissan’s 
majority African-American workforce.62  
Unlike the situation at Volkswagen, Nissan management 
vociferously opposed unionization. Whereas Volkswagen negotiated away 
its right to campaign against the union leading up to the representation 
election, Nissan took full advantage of the bevy of anti-union strategies 
afforded it under federal labor law.63 In addition to the usual tactics, rumors 
swirled that the company would take away its leased-car benefits that 
allowed workers to drive Nissan vehicles at below-market rates with no 
credit application.64 And in a pair of unfair labor practice charges filed with 
the Board, the UAW accused Nissan officials of telling workers that the 
plant would shut down if they voted in favor of unionization,65 as well as 
surveilling its employees by rating them in degrees of pro-union 
sentiment.66  
But management was only one prong of what labor writer Chris 
Brooks has deemed the South’s “anti-union trifecta,” which includes the 
company itself, business advocacy groups, and the local political 
establishment.67 “Vote No” signs appeared in the windows and on the lawns 
of most of Canton’s businesses.68 The Mississippi Chamber of Commerce 
and the National Association of Manufacturers saturated television channels 
                                                      
61 Silvia, supra note 31, at 16. 
62 See Scheiber, supra note 61; Brooks, supra note 1. 
63 See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text; Brooks, supra note 1. 
64 Brooks, supra note 1. 
65 Id. 
66 Josh Eidelson, Union Says Nissan Surveils Workers at Mississippi Plant, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 29, 2017, 3:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-29/uaw-
alleges-nissan-surveils-workers-at-plant-where-union-failed. 
67 See Brooks, supra note 1; Labor’s Southern Strategy: A Conversation Between Chris 
Brooks and Gene Bruskin, DOLLARS & SENSE (September/October 2017), 
http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/2017/0917brooks-bruskin.html [hereinafter Brooks & 
Bruskin].  
68 See Dave Jamieson, United Auto Workers Lose Crucial Union Battle at Mississippi 
Nissan Plant, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2017, 12:42 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/entry/uaw-nissan-vote-uaw-rejected_us [hereinafter Jamieson]; see also Mike Elk 
(@MikeElk), TWITTER (Aug. 2, 2017, 8:29 PM), https://twitter.com/MikeElk/status/ 
892905275631562753.  
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with anti-union ads.69 Americans for Prosperity—a conservative 501(c)(4) 
organization funded by Charles and David H. Koch—stuffed mailboxes 
with 25,000 pamphlets that promised economic ruin should the UAW 
prevail in the election.70 Republican Governor Phil Bryant was even more 
explicit, posting a picture on his official Facebook account depicting 
crumbling urban buildings accompanied with the following message: “I 
hope the employees at Nissan Canton understand what the UAW will do to 
your factory and town. Just ask Detroit. Vote no on the union.”71 Most 
appallingly, a local radio station aired an interview with an unidentified 
man who proclaimed that Nissan workers would return to “hauling corn and 
picking cotton and ploughing fields or digging ditches” should the UAW 
force the Japanese automaker out of Mississippi.72   
When the dust settled, the UAW had suffered another major loss in a 
Board-officiated election, this one more lopsided than at Volkswagen: 2,244 
votes against unionization to 1,307 in favor. The union filed unfair labor 
practice charges with the Board against Nissan in protest of its more 
flagrant labor violations,73 but the trifecta’s overall campaign strategy 
remains undefeated in large-scale, media-intensive elections.74 Moreover, 
the tumultuous atmosphere of a hotly-contested organizing campaign has 
                                                      
69 Brooks, supra note 1. 
70 Id. 
71 Jamieson, supra note 69.  
72 Lucy Pasha-Robinson, Nissan: Mississippi Radio Warns Workers They’ll Go Back to 
‘Picking Cotton’ If They Unionise as Plant Rejects UAW in Vote, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 5, 
2017, 5:19 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/nissan-mississippi-
radio-workers-picking-cotton-unionise-uaw-reject-vote-a7878236.html.  
73 See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
74 In the other major southern organizing effort conducted in recent years, the International 
Association of Machinists union suffered a blowout election loss at Boeing’s Charleston, 
South Carolina plant under conditions strikingly similar to what the UAW faced against 
Nissan. See Chris Brooks, It’s Not Over, JACOBIN (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/boeing-south-carolina-union-machinists-labor-
organize-uaw-chatanooga-volkswagen (“Boeing and a statewide business advocacy group 
saturated local television, radio, newspapers, and social media with hundreds of anti-union 
ads.”) [hereinafter It’s Not Over]; see also Josh Eidelson, Boeing’s Best Union Buster Is 
South Carolina’s Governor Nikki Haley, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2015, 10:45 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-17/nikki-haley-proud-union-buster-at-
boeing-south-carolina-i8lpjuao (drawing parallels between Haley’s anti-union efforts on 
behalf of Boeing and those of Corker against the UAW). For an extreme example of the 
anti-union culture in South Carolina, see Steven Greenhouse, How Do You Drive Out a 
Union? South Carolina Factory Provides a Textbook Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/14/us/how-do-you-drive-out-a-union-south-carolina-
factory-provides-a-textbook.html?mtrref=www.google.com.  
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the added effect of driving exhausted workers to vote for a sense of 
normalcy. As Nissan worker and UAW supporter Robert Hathorn stated in 
an interview shortly after the election:  
“I heard people say ‘I’ll be glad when this is over.’ You 
know, they’re tired with it. . . . If I was in [a neutral voter’s] 
shoes, I probably would’ve said the same thing. . . .  because 
it was every single day. . . . It’s like a song you can’t get out 
of your head.”75 
II. BYPASSING SECTION 8(A)(1) THROUGH THIRD-PARTY INTERFERENCE 
A. The “Laboratory Conditions” Doctrine  
It is well understood in industry relations that threats to workers’ job 
security—even veiled ones—may substantially impair employees’ 
autonomy in the workplace. Judge Learned Hand once articulated this 
concept in eloquent fashion: 
Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only 
a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of 
each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take 
their purport from the setting in which they are used of 
which the relation between the speaker and the hearer is 
perhaps the most important part. What to an outsider will be 
no more than the vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an 
employee may be the manifestation of a determination which 
it is not safe to thwart.76 
Labor law contemplates this dilemma. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA 
deems it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain 
or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights” to engage in concerted 
activities for mutual aid or protection.77 Policing an employer’s curtailment 
of his or her employees’ rights to union organizing remains a constant 
imperative of the Board, but it views the build-up to a representation 
election as an especially vulnerable time. This added layer of protection first 
                                                      
75 Payday Report, Q&A Robert Hathorn: Nissan workers’ regrets and the fight back., 
YOUTUBE (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jWqmsyFPGk. 
76 NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (emphasis added). 
77 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). 
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took form in the landmark case of General Shoe Corp.,78 where the Board 
held that it possessed the power to set aside the results of an election and 
order a new one even in cases where an unfair labor practice was not 
committed. The majority grounded its decision in enforcing employees’ 
freedom of choice pursuant to the Board’s authority under Section 9 of the 
Act: 
Conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders 
improbable a free choice will sometimes warrant invalidating 
an election, even though that conduct may not constitute an 
unfair labor practice. An election can serve its true purpose 
only if the surrounding conditions enable employees to 
register a free and untrammeled choice for or against a 
bargaining representative. 
… 
In election proceedings, it is the Board’s function to provide 
a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, 
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the 
uninhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to 
establish those conditions; it is also our duty to determine 
whether they have been fulfilled. When, in the extreme case, 
the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that of 
others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not present and 
the experiment must be conducted over again.79  
Thus, if the conditions of the experiment are upset by conduct that is 
“calculated to prevent a free and untrammeled choice by the employees” to 
the point where they may no longer freely express their desires to vote for 
or against unionization, the Board must nullify the results of the election 
and conduct another one.80    
                                                      
78 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). 
79 Id. at 126-27. 
80 Id. at 126. The Board acknowledged that elections did “not occur in a laboratory where 
controlled or artificial conditions may be established,” and that, accordingly, the Board’s 
goal was “to establish ideal conditions insofar as possible,” and to assess “the actual facts 
in the light of realistic standards of human conduct.” Midland National Life Insurance Co., 
263 N.L.R.B. 127, 130 (1982) (quoting The Liberal Market, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1481, 1482 
(1954)).  
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The Board thereafter set aside elections where employer conduct 
“impaired the free and informed atmosphere requisite to an untrammeled 
expression of choice by its employees,”81 which included deceptive 
campaign propaganda in the form of fraud or forgery,82 indirect threats of 
the loss of jobs or benefits,83 threats of physical violence and retaliation,84 
and inflammatory racial appeals.85  
As an ancillary matter, it is worth mentioning that at least some 
scholarship has taken issue with the laboratory conditions doctrine’s tension 
with Section 8(c) of the NLRA.86 That section—included in the Taft-
Hartley amendments as a response to the New Deal-era Board’s perceived 
transgression of employers’ inherent speech rights87—instructs that an 
employer’s expression or dissemination of his or her “views, arguments, or 
opinion” does not constitute an unfair labor practice so long as it “contains 
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”88 The General Shoe 
                                                      
81 The Timken-Detroit Axle Company, 98 N.L.R.B. 790, 792 (1952). 
82 See, e.g., id.; United Aircraft Corporation, 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953). But see supra notes 
5-6 and accompanying text. 
83 See., e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962) (overruling cases 
upholding “implied threats couched in the guise of statements of legal position” as 
privileged under § 8(c)).  
84 RJR Archer, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 335 (1985). 
85 Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). 
86 See Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Note, Free Speech and the NLRB’s Laboratory Conditions 
Doctrine, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204 (2002) [hereinafter Larsen-Bright]; James W. Wimberly, 
Jr. & Martin H. Steckel, NLRB Campaign Laboratory Conditions Doctrine and Free 
Speech Revisited, 32 MERC. L. REV. 535 (1981). While much has been written about the 
balancing of labor-related speech rights in the workplace, these appear to be the only 
academic pieces that examine the laboratory conditions doctrine at article-length. Cf. Derek 
C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 45 (1964) (criticizing the doctrine as 
vague and intangible); Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of 
Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
753, 793-97 (1994) (criticizing the doctrine’s reliance on the “marketplace of ideas” 
justification and proposing its replacement with an “ideal of egalitarian deliberation” that 
“neutralize[s] the effect of relations of power and subordination on deliberative procedure 
and outcomes”); Brishen Rogers, Passion and Reason in Labor Law, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 313, 323-28 (2012) (echoing much of Barenberg’s critique). However, Craig 
Becker—then-law professor and now-General Counsel of the AFL-CIO—tackled the 
doctrine in his intellectual tour de force on employer participation in union representation 
elections and noted the same tension from labor’s perspective. Craig Becker, Democracy in 
the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 
495, 548-61, 569-70 (1993) [hereinafter Becker]. 
87 See Larsen-Bright, supra note 86, at 215 nn. 55-59; Becker, supra note 86, at 535-47. 
88 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012). 
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case, which empowers the Board to regulate employers’ speech even 
without a finding of an unfair labor practice under Section 8, arguably 
circumvents the Taft-Harley Congress’s intent to shield employers from the 
Board’s expansive reading of employee protections in the context of a 
representation election. However, the doctrine to this point has not been 
seriously questioned by reviewing judges or subsequent Board personnel,89 
and the matter of employer activity falls outside the scope of this Article. 
B. The Board’s Treatment of Third-Party Interference 
More interesting for our purposes is the laboratory conditions 
doctrine’s application to interference by third parties—that is, persons or 
organizations not directly affiliated with the statutory parties to the election. 
The Board’s standard for reviewing third-party misconduct has changed 
with revisions to federal labor law and adapted to unique fact patterns, but 
the Board has generally sought to corral flagrantly anti-union behavior since 
its inception. 
1. The Board’s Original Approach Under the Wagner Act 
(1935–47) 
Not long after its formation, the Board addressed head-on the issue 
of “community pressure” against union organizing.90 In the original NLRA, 
known colloquially as the Wagner Act for its lead proponent, New York 
Senator Robert F. Wagner, Section 2(2) stated that an “employer” was “any 
person acting in the interest of the employer, directly or indirectly . . .”91 
The original Roosevelt-appointed Board members adopted a broad 
interpretation of “employer.” Where it was found that members of the 
community consciously instigated adverse public feeling toward the union 
and its organizing efforts, the employer was held responsible for violating 
                                                      
89 See Larsen-Bright, supra note 86, at 217-22. The General Shoe case was briefly 
controversial in partisan politics, earning immediate criticism and condemnation from the 
Taft-Hartley Congress. JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. 
LABOR RELATIONS POLICY 35-36, 50 (1995). However, legislative attempts to overturn the 
policy or persuade the Board to abandon it have never come to fruition.  
90 See Thomas Wade Phillips, Note, An Analysis of Third Party Community Pressures and 
Their Effect upon Union Organizational Activities, 22 VAND. L. REV. 322, 323-28 (1969) 
[hereinafter Phillips].  
91 Id. at 323. 
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Section 8(1) of the Act,92 even if such action was only the creating or 
fostering of a sentiment that the employer's plant would be moved if it were 
unionized.93  
In reaction to this expansive reading of Section 2(2), as well as to 
broader concerns about the Board’s disregard of employers’ speech rights,94 
Congress amended the section in 1947 to state: “The term ‘employer’ 
includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly 
. . . .”95 Thus, the Board could no longer find unfair labor practices against 
employers for anti-union community pressure without some proof that the 
group's actions were either authorized or ratified by the employer, thus 
vacating the respondeat superior-esque justification the Board had 
promulgated to that point. “The obvious effect” of this piece of the Taft-
Hartley Act, as one commentator noted in reflection of the legislative 
history, “was to make it much more difficult for the Board to control anti-
union community pressures,”96 especially pivotal at the time of major 
southern organizing efforts.97 
2. The Fine-Tuning of Laboratory Conditions to Measure 
Community Pressure (1948–Present) 
However, employers’ victory on this specific doctrinal front was 
ultimately short-lived. In General Shoe, decided one year after the passage 
of Taft-Hartley, the Board determined that it had the power to set aside 
election results even in cases where neither party committed an unfair labor 
practice.98 The majority’s opinion made no mention of limiting the 
enforcement of its laboratory conditions doctrine to the employer or union 
                                                      
92 See, e.g., Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626 (1937) (holding that employer interfered 
with employees’ organizing rights by instigating and organizing antiunion hostility, which 
included warning citizens and public officials of perceived communal consequences of 
unionization); see also Phillips, supra note 90, at 325 n.9. 
93 See, e.g., Merit Clothing Co. 30 N.L.R.B. 1201 (1941) (finding that the anti-union 
activities of the town mayor and other private citizens were directly traceable to the fear of 
community citizens that the employer would close his plant if union activity continued); 
see also Phillips, supra note 90, at 325 n.14. 
94 See supra note 87. 
95 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) 
(emphasis added); see also Phillips, supra note 90, at 328. 
96 Phillips, supra note 90, at 328-29. 
97 See Yeselson, supra note 23; Michael Goldfield, The Failure of Operation Dixie: A 
Critical Turning Point in American Political Development?, in GARY M. FINK & EARL E. 
REED, RACE, CLASS, AND COMMUNITY IN SOUTHERN LABOR HISTORY (1994). 
98 See supra notes 78-85. 
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(or agents of either party). As such, any misconduct that sufficiently 
interfered with employees’ freedom of choice could taint the experiment 
and require its repetition.  
While the Board still held employers liable for violations of Section 
8(a)(1) where it was found that anti-union third-parties were acting as 
“agents” of an employer, and thus satisfied the stricter standard of the 
revised Section 2(2),99 the Board applied the laboratory conditions doctrine 
in cases where there was no agency relationship at all between the 
transgressor and the company at issue.100 In James Lees & Sons Co.,101 for 
example, the Board set aside an election where substantial anti-union 
activity from the community created an “atmosphere of fear” at the plant 
where workers were considering unionization,102 which, among other 
things, included local banks refusing to make loans to known union 
supporters. Importantly, the Board stated that it was immaterial whether the 
employer was “responsible for the generation of the fear which interfered 
with the free choice of ballot.”103 This atmosphere of fear concept was 
thereafter frequently invoked in cases analyzing the extent of interference 
arising from third-party activists.104  
Around this time, the Board set aside elections where community 
pressure upset laboratory conditions in the form of anti-union industrial 
advisory committees,105 full-page newspaper advertisements warning of 
economic harm,106 and letters and editorials that predicted plants would 
leave town in the event of unionization.107 This also held true for public 
officials that crusaded against union organizing efforts. In Utica-Herbrand 
Tool Division of Kelsey-Hayes Co.,108 the Board invalidated an election 
where officials and influential citizens of the community, through a 
“barrage of propaganda” that included letters, visits to employees' homes, 
                                                      
99 See Phillips, supra note 90, at 330-38. 
100 Id. at 341-44. 
101 130 N.L.R.B. 290 (1961). 
102 Id. at 291. 
103 Id. at 299.  
104 See Benson Veneer Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 781 (1966); Myrna Mills, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 767 
(1961); Lake Catherine Footwear, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 443 (1961). 
105 See Benson Veneer Co., 156 N.L.R.B. at 793-94; Proctor-Silex Corp., 159 N.L.R.B. 598 
(1966); Lifetime Door Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 13 (1966). 
106 See Monarch Rubber Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958). 
107 See Automotive Controls Corp., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (1967). 
108 145 N.L.R.B. 1717 (1964). 
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radio broadcasts, and newspaper editorials and advertisements, insisted that 
unionization would force the employer to move its plant and bring 
economic ruin upon the area.109 This aggressive campaigning from external 
forces contributed to an “atmosphere of fear of reprisal and loss of job 
opportunity if the employees selected the [union] as their bargaining agent”, 
effectively destroying the “laboratory atmosphere which the Board seeks for 
its elections.”110 
The Board’s scrutiny of public officials eventually expanded in 
stature, progressing from city councilmen and local business owners to 
statewide officials and congressional figures. Notably, these individuals 
often spoke in favor of unions. In Columbia Tanning Corp.,111 the Board set 
aside an election where the Massachusetts state labor commissioner wrote a 
letter in Greek to Greece-native employees one day before the election, 
praising the union that was campaigning for certification and ultimately 
endorsing its petition.112 The Board held that workers had been deprived of 
a free choice in the election because many of the immigrant employees who 
received the letter likely did not know the difference between the state and 
federal labor boards, thus creating a perception that the “government” was 
endorsing the union on the eve of the vote.113 This inquiry was relaxed for 
more generic statements of solidarity. In Chipman Union, Inc.,114 the Board 
denied an employer’s request to overturn an election in which a United 
States Congresswoman wrote a one-page letter to employees voicing her 
support for their “struggle for fairness and justice in the workplace.”115 
Here, the Congresswoman’s statements could not be reasonably confused as 
an official government endorsement a la Columbia Tanning, and “it was 
clear that [she] was speaking only for herself and that her message 
contained no threat or coercive statement whatsoever.”116 Similarly, in 
Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc.,117 the majority held that a pro-union 
                                                      
109 Id. at 1726. 
110 Id. at 1719, 1722. 
111 238 N.L.R.B. 899 (1978).  
112 Id. at 900. 
113 Id. Cf. Ursery Companies, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 399 (1993) (determining that employees 
would not confuse a pro-union statement from a state representative distributed on official 
union stationery as a government endorsement of the union).   
114 316 N.L.R.B. 107 (1995). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 107-108. 
117 337 N.L.R.B. 82 (2001). 
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Congressman’s relatively benign statement about workers’ disadvantages in 
the context of federal labor law (contra employer’s advantages under the 
NLRA) did not upset the laboratory conditions of the election to the point 
that it necessitated setting aside the union’s victory.118    
If one were to construct a standard emanating from this line of cases, 
it appears that the Board is wary of assigning too much influence to public 
officials’ statements unless there is a significant possibility that the intended 
audience may confuse the speaker’s opinion for an official government 
endorsement of one party to the election.119 Historically, however, the 
Board is not hesitant to police those statements that are packaged as 
economic threats, and it considers the cumulative effect of individual 
incidents of third-party misconduct in evaluating the fairness of an 
election.120 Each coercive action can potentially magnify the other, 
                                                      
118 Id. The Congressman’s words appeared in full in Chairman Hurtgen’s dissenting 
opinion: 
The Company has also refused to debate this important issue, claiming 
that federal labor laws do not allow a fair debate because the laws restrict 
what an employer can say. As a United States Congressman with a strong 
interest in labor law, I can assure you that the law does indeed allow for a 
fair debate. If the company chooses not to debate, that is their right, but 
they should not hide behind misstatements about federal regulations. In 
fact, the laws are structured in such a way as to make it extremely 
difficult for workers to organize—not the other way around. 
Id. (emphasis in original) (Hurtgen, Chairman, dissenting). Astoundingly, Chairman 
Hurtgen would have held the Congressman’s statement per se coercive because of the level 
of his office: “My view is simply that a Congressman should also stay away from that issue 
in the context of pro-party comments in an ongoing organizational campaign.” Id. at 83. 
The Chairman supplied no explanation for his contention that identical statements from the 
workers’ employer would not be similarly coercive besides insisting that “[a]s to matters of 
law, employees are likely to view the response of a Federal official as more reliable than 
that of a private party to the election.” Id.   
119 For additional examples, see Affiliated Computer Servs., 355 N.L.R.B. 899, 900-901 
(2010) (during which State Senator’s expressed concern that employer’s proposed 
compensation plan “may result in layoffs in our state and in the borough that I represent” 
could not reasonably be construed as coercive upon employees or as a “veiled threat” to 
employer); Trump Plaza Hotel & Casino, 352 N.L.R.B. 628, 629 (2008) (determining that 
statements from three state and federal elected officials asserting that they had examined 
signed authorization cards and concluded a majority of the employees in the bargaining 
unit had authorized the union to represent them was not coercive and would be interpreted 
as a mere expressions of opinion). 
120 See Picoma Industries, Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 498, 498 (1989) (stressing the need to 
“consider the cumulative credited evidence in determining the effect of third-party 
preelection misconduct” on election results); see also Universal Mfg. Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 
1459 (1966) (finding that coordinated anti-union actions by members of the community 
violated laboratory conditions of the election).  
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snowballing the stress and tension of the campaign until they create the 
atmosphere of fear that settles upon workers’ cities, neighborhoods, and 
homes—hence community pressure.    
III. TAKING THE EXPERIMENT SERIOUSLY: ADAPTING THE LABORATORY 
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE TO CURB ANTI-UNION COMMUNITY PRESSURE 
Those cognizant of this extra layer of prophylactic enforcement 
invoked it following the UAW’s loss in Chattanooga. In the days between 
the election and the union filing charges with the Board, labor law scholar 
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt argued that “[i]f in fact [Senator Corker] made 
fraudulent statements with the intent of intimidating workers, that would be 
a violation of laboratory conditions.”121 The falsity of Corker’s claims—that 
Volkswagen would expand production at Chattanooga only if its workforce 
voted against unionization—is almost a certainty. The company 
immediately disavowed the Senator’s comments,122 and while the 
Chattanooga plant was eventually awarded the SUV production line Corker 
spoke of, the announcement came several months after the fallout of the 
election results,123 whereas Corker promised such an announcement would 
come within weeks of the union’s loss. Moreover, documents obtained by 
Tennessee journalists after the election revealed that the offices of Corker 
and Governor Haslam coordinated anti-UAW messaging with various state 
Republicans and anti-union organizations leading up to the vote, unveiling a 
far more collaborative mobilization against the union effort than any 
individual had suggested transpired.124 Most damning was Haslam’s 
                                                      
121 Moshe Z. Marvit, What Are the UAW’s Legal Options After the Volkswagen Defeat?, IN 
THESE TIMES (Feb. 18, 2014, 12:14 PM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/16306 
/uaw_legal_options_volkswagen_defeat.  
122 Silvia, supra note 31, at 14 (“[Volkswagen] CEO [Frank] Fischer released a response, 
asserting that there was ‘no connection between our Chattanooga employees’ decision 
about whether to be represented by a union and the decision about where to build a new 
product for the US market’”). 
123 See Aaron M. Kessler, Volkswagen to Add S.U.V. Line to Chattanooga Plant, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/business/vw-to-add-suv-
production-to-chattanooga-plant.html?mtrref=www.google.com. The company announced 
in April 2017 that it was adding yet another SUV line to its Chattanooga plant. David 
Shepardson, Volkswagen to Build New SUV in Tennessee Plant, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2017, 
9:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autoshow-new-york-vw/volkswagen-to-
build-new-suv-in-tennessee-plant-idUSKBN17E1UB.    
124 See Mike Elk, Emails Show Sen. Corker’s Chief of Staff Coordinated with Network of 
Anti-UAW Union Busters, IN THESE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2014, 11:05 PM), 
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/16505/emails_show_bob_corkers_chief_of_staff_co
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retraction of a $300 million offer in economic incentives to Volkswagen 
that was contingent on the company actively opposing the UAW’s 
organizing efforts.125   
True to Dau-Schmidt’s prediction, the UAW filed objections to the 
election results on the basis of third-party misconduct.126 The union’s 
objection asserted that threats were “made by powerful political leaders 
who, in fact and in the reasonable perception of the employees, were quite 
capable of putting their threat into effect.”127 These politicians—aided by 
private interest groups—repeatedly threatened the “diminishment of job 
security if the workers vote for the union” until their message “was known 
to every potential voter in this extremely high visibility campaign.”128 
While the UAW eventually withdrew its charges to facilitate other 
organizing attempts at the Chattanooga plant,129 thus relinquishing its right 
to litigate the issue before a favorable, Obama-stocked Board,130 the theory 
raised in the objections is ripe for review by future Boards. As recent events 
in Mississippi demonstrated, the community pressure encountered at 
Volkswagen was not unique; both pro- and anti-union forces alike 
recognize that each foreign automaker plant in the region may represent a 
strategic stronghold for the future solvency of organized labor. As a simple 
                                                                                                                                         
ordinated_with_anti_uaw_groups; John Logan, Evidence of GOP Interference in VW 
Election Is Now Overwhelming, TRUTHOUT (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.truth-
out.org/opinion/item/23007-evidence-of-gop-interference-in-vw-election-is-now-
overwhelming.  
125 Phil Williams, Haslam Offers No Apologies For $300M Volkswagen Offer, NEWS 
CHANNEL 5, http://www.newschannel5.com/story/25135576/haslam-offers-no-apologies-
for-300m-volkswagen-offer. The incentives—comprised of taxpayer money—were 
“subject to works council discussions . . . being concluded to the satisfaction of the State of 
Tennessee.” Id.; see also Michael Ballaban, Tennessee Governor Leveled A $300 Million 
Threat At VW Over UAW Vote, JALOPNIK (Apr. 1, 2014, 1:20 PM), 
https://jalopnik.com/tennessee-governor-leveled-a-300-million-threat-at-vw-1556229931; 
Alexander Stoklosa, Documents Back Up UAW Claim of “Political Interference” in VW 
Chattanooga Vote, CAR AND DRIVER (Apr. 2, 2014, 3:05 PM), 
https://blog.caranddriver.com/documents-back-up-uaw-claim-of-political-interference-in-
vw-chattanooga-vote/.  
126 UAW Objections, supra note 54, at 10-12. 
127 Id. at 11. 
128 Id. at 9, 11. 
129 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
130 Assuming that the Board would have rendered a final decision in the Volkswagen case 
within 41 months of the UAW’s initial filing, any expansion of the laboratory conditions 
doctrine would have been in place by the time the UAW petitioned for a representation 
election at Nissan’s Mississippi plant in July 2017.  
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matter of logistics, unions must organize the American South to both 
expand membership and protect contractual gains made in more labor-
friendly states.131 Large-scale organizing campaigns in traditionally anti-
union areas of the country will continue to occur in the coming years, and it 
is imperative that the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the 
NLRA’s twin protections of industrial peace and employees’ freedom of 
choice132 adapt its machinery to shield elections from coercive third-party 
conduct. Interference by anti-union politicians, business groups, and private 
interests are only incentivized by further dormancy.  
A. Applying Extant Case Law to the UAW’s Roadblocks  
Appropriately, the crux of the UAW’s legal argument relied upon 
Westwood Horizons Hotel;133 the Board’s current standard for determining 
whether third-party misconduct created “a general atmosphere of fear and 
reprisal rendering a free election impossible.”134 Here, the Board would 
apply a five-factor test to the various statements made during the elections 
at Nissan or Volkswagen by considering: 
(1) the nature of the threat itself; 
(2) whether it encompassed the entire [bargaining] unit; 
(3) the extent of dissemination; 
                                                      
131 The case of the Machinists union and Boeing is demonstrative. See supra note 75. 
Boeing built its newest plant in South Carolina, home of the lowest union density in the 
country, see Union Density, supra note 22, explicitly in reaction to the frequent labor 
disputes the company experienced at its plant in Seattle. Andrew Strom, Boeing and the 
NLRB—A Sixty-Four Year-Old Time Bomb Explodes, 68 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 109 
(2011). The company has since laid off thousands of workers in the state of Washington. 
Dominic Gates, Boeing plans hundreds of layoff notices for engineers this week, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017, 11:47 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/boeing-plans-hundreds-of-layoffs-for-engineers-this-week/ (“Boeing cut almost 
7,400 jobs in the state” in 2016 alone). By any reasonable estimation, the Machinists union 
must organize Boeing’s only non-union plant to prevent the further siphoning of jobs and 
production assignments from its union shops. See It’s Not Over, supra note 74 (“[L]ike the 
[UAW] at [Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors], the Machinists union has only one option 
for protecting its gains and winning back what it has lost: it must organize in the South.”). 
132 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). For an example 
of the Supreme Court’s invocation of these principles, see Fall River Dyeing and Finishing 
Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 38 (1987). 
133 270 N.L.R.B. 802 (1984); see also UAW Objections, supra note 54, at 11.  
134 Westwood Horizons, 270 N.L.R.B. 802, 803 (1984). 
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(4) whether the person making the threat was capable of carrying it out, 
and whether it is likely that employees acted in fear of that 
capability; and 
(5) whether the threat was made or revived at or near the time of the 
election.135 
The community pressure directed at the UAW in both campaigns 
undoubtedly clears Westwood Horizon’s hurdles. First, most threats were 
predicated on the potential loss of jobs for the employees at Nissan and 
Volkswagen, often explicitly referencing the layoffs and economic 
recession suffered in the union’s headquarters of Detroit. Corker’s coercion 
hit from the opposite end, promising additional jobs and a plant expansion if 
Volkswagen’s workers voted against the UAW. Combined, such warnings 
and assurances—which are automatic unfair labor practices if mentioned by 
an employer—invoke Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s famous quip that 
“[t]he danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion 
of a fist inside the velvet glove.”136 
 Second, these anti-union statements were exclusively directed at the 
entire rank-and-file workforces of both plants. Whether threatening job 
losses or promising job security, both tactics were designed to appeal to as 
many employees as possible so as to harm the union’s position on the shop 
floor and in the community. This factor is typically applied in cases where 
threats are made to an individual or a small number of employees within 
larger bargaining units,137 but here there was no such specificity.     
 Third, the statements were widely disseminated through extensive 
media coverage. The UAW’s objections documented the flood of media 
attention paid specifically to Corker’s assurances,138 and noted that “the 
‘No2UAW’ Facebook page, a center of debate on the campaign, placed 
beyond doubt how the Corker threats were to be read by the [Volkswagen] 
workforce” by frequently linking to media reports of his statements.139 
Nissan workers such as Robert Hathorn described a general feeling of 
                                                      
135 Lamar Advertising of Janesville, 340 N.L.R.B. 979, 980 (2003) (citing Westwood 
Horizons, 270 N.L.R.B. at 803). 
136 NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 410 (1964). 
137 See, e.g., MasTec Direct TV, 356 N.L.R.B. 809, 811-12 (2011) (finding pro-union 
employee’s physical threat to four co-workers did not create a general atmosphere of fear 
and reprisal in part because employee’s threats did not encompass the entire unit). 
138 UAW Objections, supra note 54, at 14-58. 
139 See id. at 12, 57-58. 
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exhaustion and inundation from the anti-union organizations’ messaging in 
Mississippi.140  
 The fourth factor requires the most speculation without Board-
conducted hearings and employee testimony, but it seems self-evident that 
Volkswagen employees would consider the combined forces of the state’s 
legislature, governor, and a United States senator to be capable of making 
good on their threats of withholding tax subsidies or promises of added 
production.141 Nissan employees in Mississippi, while only subjected to 
Facebook posts and general anti-union sentiments from their governor,142 
were nonetheless tasked with weighing the words of a unified local business 
scene that constantly warned of the perils of unionization. It cannot be said 
for certain whether a critical mass of employees based their vote on this 
community pressure, but the purpose of powerful people’s issuing strong 
statements is assumedly to exert influence in achieving their desired result.   
 Finally, the timing of these statements in both elections was clearly 
intended to maximize their impact. Governor Bryant vocalized his Detroit-
themed warning the day before the vote at Nissan, while Corker held a press 
conference on the first day of voting. Other anti-union statements, posts, 
and materials were increasingly disseminated in the days leading up to the 
election,143 mirroring the usual campaign behavior of Board-officiated 
                                                      
140 See supra notes 1, 75 and accompany text. 
141 Corker, after all, has often claimed responsibility for recruiting Volkswagen to 
Chattanooga as the city’s former mayor. See Lydia DePillis, Sen. Bob Corker Can’t Stand 
the United Auto Workers: An Annotated Interview, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/02/12/sen-bob-corker-cant-stand-
the-united-auto-workers-an-annotated-interview/?utm_term=.d33059686873 (“I’m a 
former mayor of Chattanooga. I recruited [Volkswagen] to our state. I was the first person 
to call their number, and two of the three meetings with them took place in my home in 
Chattanooga. I know [VW Chairman Martin] Winterkorn really really [sic] well. We’re in 
constant contact with Volkswagen at every level. Seriously, I don’t know a public official 
that’s been more involved with Volkswagen, nor, candidly, more involved with the 
UAW.”).  
142 See supra note 71 and accompanying text; Emily Wagster Pettus, Mississippi Governor: 
Nissan Workers Should Reject Union, U.S. NEWS (July 27, 2017, 5:01 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/mississippi/articles/2017-07-27/governor-house-
speaker-stumping-at-neshoba-county-fair.  
143 See Silvia, supra note 31, at 12-15; Dave Jamieson, Nissan Launches Anti-Union Blitz 
Ahead of Pivotal UAW Election, HUFFINGTON POST (July 30, 2017, 5:53 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nissan-launches-anti-union-blitz-ahead-of-pivotal-
election-in-the-south_us_597e11d0e4b02a8434b7019d.  
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elections in which employers are actively contesting the petitioning 
union.144  
 In sum, it appears likely that a labor-sympathetic Board would 
consider massive, politically-coordinated third-party misconduct as creating 
a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal that made a free election 
impossible for the workers at Nissan and Volkswagen, especially where 
past Board decisions involving community pressure frequently invalidated 
elections on the basis of anti-union newspaper editorials, advertisements, 
and actions of local businessmen or city officials.145 The events that 
recently transpired in Mississippi and Tennessee certainly seem as coercive 
as those that took place in the middle of the twentieth century between 
unions and hostile, small-town communities, if not more so. 
 One potential counterargument arises from these cases with regard 
to Volkswagen. In the first decades of the laboratory conditions doctrine’s 
formulation, the Board would often refuse to set aside representation 
elections in borderline cases of community pressure where it was found that 
the employer publicly and privately disavowed rumors of plant closings or 
other forms of job losses.146 Thus, Volkswagen could have defended the 
results of the election on the basis that it disputed Corker’s statements and 
urged other third parties not to involve itself in the campaign.147  
However, the specific facts of the election at Volkswagen 
demonstrate the logical futility of grafting such a defense onto the actions of 
Corker and other anti-union actors. While Volkswagen officials denied that 
any plant expansion was contingent on the outcome of the election, it is not 
the company that was to be feared. Republicans leaders of the Tennessee 
legislature had already publicly threatened to withhold tax subsidies from 
the company if its workers voted to unionize. Indeed, the very reason why 
Volkswagen resisted the UAW’s call for card-check recognition as early as 
the summer of 2013 was because management feared upsetting Republican 
politicians in Tennessee.148 And if nothing else, Nissan’s aggressive 
campaign against the union in Mississippi—in addition to the alleged anti-
                                                      
144 Bronfenbrenner, supra note 6, at 20-24. 
145 See supra Part II.B.ii. 
146 See Phillips, supra note 91, at 344-45. 
147 Silvia, supra note 31, at 14. 
148 Silvia, supra note 31, at 9 (“[Volkswagen] management refused the request because 
they were ‘concerned about antagonizing Republican politicians in Tennessee.’”).  
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union behavior of other automakers across the country149—dampers any 
expectation that Volkswagen’s neutrality agreement with the UAW may 
become an industry norm.  
B. Confronting “Both Sides”-ism and its Absurdities 
Bolstering the laboratory conditions doctrine to combat anti-union 
community pressure invites an obvious criticism. In cases such as Chipman 
and Saint-Gobain, the Board declined to set aside elections in which 
members of Congress expressed support for employees’ organizing 
efforts;150 despite the fact that the politicians addressed the employees 
directly in writing and assured them of their right to join a union. If the 
Board were to find misconduct in the actions of politicians, business groups, 
and private interests that aggressively oppose unionization, those same 
parties may argue that pro-union statements by politicians should also be 
considered sufficiently disruptive of laboratory conditions. As attorneys of 
the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation have argued, “Even 
Obama weighed in with support for unionization at Volkswagen”151, and 
Senator Bernie Sanders fervently campaigned for the UAW in 
Mississippi.152 
That logic relies on a longstanding flaw in American labor law that 
has existed since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act: that persuasion from a 
union is the same as persuasion from an employer. This yin-and-yang view 
of industrial relations defies basic understandings of human psychology and 
behavioral economics. As psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky have demonstrated since the 1980s, people tend to prefer avoiding 
                                                      
149 See, e.g., David Welch, UAW Files Claim That Tesla Fired Workers Who Supported 
Union, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 26, 2017, 11:08 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2017-10-26/uaw-files-claim-that-tesla-fired-workers-who-supported-union.  
150 See supra notes 114-18. 
151 Ben Penn, UAW Files Objections Over VW Election With NLRB, Allqweeges Third-
Party Coercion, B.N.A. (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.bna.com/uaw-files-objections-
n17179882349/.  
152 Right to Work (@RightToWork), TWITTER (Nov. 17, 2017, 3:03 PM), 
https://twitter.com/RightToWork/status/931613794106781696; see also John Nichols, 
Bernie Sanders Is Going to Mississippi to March With Workers This Weekend, NATION 
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/bernie-sanders-is-going-to-mississippi-
to-march-with-workers-this-weekend/; Bernie Sanders, Nissan dispute could go down as 
most vicious anti-union crusade in decades, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2017, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/03/nissan-workers-union-bernie-sanders.  
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losses to acquiring equivalent gains.153 This phenomenon, generally referred 
to as “loss aversion,” bears out strikingly well across all sorts of decisional 
avenues,154 but it features most prominently in monetary considerations. 
Some studies estimate that individuals tend to give economic losses 
approximately two-fold the weight that they assign gains.155 
Union representation elections fit neatly into this theory: the 
decision to vote for or against unionization produces a similar (if implicit) 
economic analysis among employees in the bargaining unit. Unionizing 
alters the status quo of the workplace,156 and its advertised advantages will 
inevitably be blunted by vocalized opposition from the entities who control 
workers’ benefits, paychecks, and schedules. This resistance increasingly 
takes the form of subtle threats or warnings from management and company 
supervisors, spreading concern that a union victory may result in the loss of 
existing wages and benefits, jobs, or even the closing of the plant entirely 
should the union win certification.157 The best anti-union campaigns make 
the two concepts synonymous. 
The union is the carrot; a threat to job security is the stick. In a 
world where workers may be twice as afraid of the beating as they are 
hungry for the treat, it is a work of legal fiction to police both pro-union and 
anti-union forces alike as if their words carry the same weight when 
uttered.158 With recent events in mind, future Board members should hold 
anti-union community pressure to greater scrutiny than pro-union actions—
                                                      
153 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 334-41 (2011); DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 341-50 (1984). 
154 See Sang Lee et al., The Commonality of Loss Aversion across Procedures and Stimuli, 
PLOS ONE (Sept. 22, 2015), available at http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article 
/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0135216&type=printable.  
155 Id. at 1. 
156 Daniel Kahneman and others have observed the loss aversion theory’s utility in the 
context of status quo bias. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 193, 197-203 (1991). See also Becker, supra note 86, at 567-68. 
157 See generally Bronfenbrenner, supra note 6. 
158 More to this point, non-union employers enjoy the equivalent of despotic power over 
their workforces. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW 
EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) (2017). Meanwhile, 
unions have not possessed the authority to compel the discharge of employees for purposes 
other than their failure to pay the equivalent of membership dues and initiation fees since 
1947. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963) (Taft-Hartley modifications to 
Section 8(a)(3) effectively banned the closed shop and whittled down union-shop 
membership to “financial core” status).  
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and it should do so until the latter proves itself to be the former’s equal in 
disrupting the laboratory conditions of Board-officiated elections. Anything 
less will contribute to the widening disparity of economic power between 
capital and labor that defines our twenty-first century reality of corporate 
mobility, neoliberal governance, and increasingly feeble labor laws.  
C. The Utility of the Doctrine in the Information Age  
There is something to say about the appropriateness of re-enforcing 
a legal maxim that is nearing its seventieth birthday in coverage of rapidly 
changing industries. Multiple criticisms can be made against its extension 
from even a pro-union standpoint. First, the need for “laboratory 
conditions” rests upon an analogy that champions neutrality where 
government impartiality may ultimately mean extinction for organized 
labor.159 Second, the doctrine favors NLRB election machinery in an era 
that has proven that anything but card-check recognition inherently favors 
management and supposes that the election process itself is a system of 
industrial governance worth saving.160 Third, and perhaps most operational, 
a doctrine predicated on censoring opinions and withholding information 
from voters is futile in an era where opinions and information are 
increasingly accessible.161 
While infringements such as Corker’s assurances seem eminently 
punishable, more subtle statements of labor-management viewpoints may 
be impossible to police but remain just as effective. Furthermore, 
organizing communications increasingly take place online and not in 
traditional media, incentivizing the swift flow of information at critical 
points in the campaign.  The remedy for a violation of laboratory 
conditions—a redo of the election—seemingly dooms unions to a cycle of 
fighting foes it cannot stop with weapons it cannot match. 
These are valid assessments, and they suggest that Board law needs 
a serious overhaul in more ways than one. But this analysis does not purport 
to be anything more than a fine-tuning of an existing doctrine to produce 
                                                      
159 See supra Part III.B. 
160 See generally Becker, supra note 86 (arguing that management has no legitimate 
interest in workers’ decision to unionize); Ezra Klein, How Bad is Card Check?, THE 
AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 20, 2006), http://prospect.org/article/how-bad-card-check.  
161 See generally Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Limiting Information in the Information Age: 
The NLRB’s Misguided Attempt to Squelch Employer Speech, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 473 
(2013). 
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more equitable outcomes from the resources that are already available. 
While unions should be actively searching for ways to alter a playing field 
that has refused to fight fair for decades, labor must fire its loaded guns. 
CONCLUSION 
Although this article has been sympathetic to the UAW’s plight (as 
well as that of other labor organizations braving the Southern Cage), it does 
not mean to minimize the union’s campaign missteps. There is much to be 
said about the self-immolating nature of the UAW’s cherished neutrality 
agreement with Volkswagen, which left at least some workers wondering 
what they were fighting for by draining the union of its adversarial 
element,162 and its campaign at Nissan was rife with criticism of basic 
strategic blunders.163 Certainly at least some blame must be placed upon the 
leadership of today’s largest manufacturing-based unions, who—in the face 
of globalization and an increasingly hostile political climate—have pushed 
collaboration with corporations and accepted concessions on contracts.164 
However, it is not clear that the UAW’s tactical shortcomings robbed it of 
sure victories at Nissan or Volkswagen, and it does not follow that more 
militant unionism would have won the day at either plant. 
The problem for unions remains the same regardless of their 
posture: labor wishes to extract more value from the goods and services it 
produces, and capital will oppose additional labor costs to maintain its share 
of profits. Given this diametric conflict in economic order, perhaps it is 
pointless to advocate for tweaks to doctrines of small subsets of American 
labor law; it may be futile to make any doctrinal changes at all to the laws 
as they currently exist. If so, it is better to wait for major legislative reforms 
that fundamentally alter the ways in which unions organize or collectively 
                                                      
162 See Silvia, supra note 31, at 16; Mike Elk, How Sweetheart Deals Hurt Labor, 
COMMON   DREAMS (Feb.  18,  2014),   https://www.commondreams.org/views/2014/02/18 
/how-sweetheart-deals-hurt-labor; Wayne Cliett, Why Do Auto Workers Union Drives Keep 
Failing? A Rank-and-File View, LABOR NOTES (Jan. 10, 2018), http://labornotes.org/blogs/ 
2018/01/why-do-auto-workers-union-drives-keep-failing-rank-and-file-view?language=es.  
163 The major targets of criticism were the UAW’s rank-and-file organizing committee, 
which was allegedly understaffed and unrepresentative of the plant as a whole, and the 
union’s decision to call for a vote while lacking the desired supermajority of authorization 
cards from members in the bargaining unit. See Brooks & Bruskin, supra note 67. 
164 See Sam Gindin, Lessons from Chattanooga, JACOBIN (Feb. 24, 2014), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/02/lessons-from-chattanooga/; Dianne Feeley, Against 
the New Normal, JACOBIN (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/uaw-
autoworkers-contracts-ford-chrysler-gm-fiat-marchionne/.  
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bargain with employers. Unions would thus be better served waiting for 
national card-check legislation,165 industry-wide bargaining rights,166 or 
perhaps even a comprehensive successor to the National Labor Relations 
Act.167 
But this argument puts the cart before the horse. It assumes that a 
critical mass of legislators will eventually decide to spend time, resources, 
and political capital reforming labor law and championing unions, even 
though the post-Reagan labor movement is bereft of major organizing 
victories that could serve as a symbol of resurgence.168 People who are not 
in unions need a reason to care about unions, and it is difficult to 
communicate the benefits of collective bargaining rights when seemingly 
the only times unions appear in national media is through coverage of major 
defeats in organizing drives169 or through passage of state Right-to-Work 
laws.  
                                                      
165 Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); accord Brent 
Garren & Zachary Henige, The Employee Free Choice Act (“EFCA”): Salvaging Sec. 7 
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166 Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L. J. 2 (2016); accord Dylan Matthews, 
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Casselman, Americans Don’t Miss Manufacturing—They Miss Unions, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(May 13, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-dont-miss- 
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Anna Louie Sussman, Are Women the New Face of Organized Labor?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
7, 2015, 8:08 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/09/07/are-women-the-new-face-
of-organized-labor/; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2016, U.S. DEP’T 
LABOR, available at https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (showing that “Black 
workers were more likely to be union members [in 2016] than were White, Asian, or 
Hispanic workers”). 
169 National media have a penchant for describing most union elections they bother 
covering as “historic.” See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, Auto union loses historic election at 
Volkswagen plant in Tennessee, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/02/14/united-auto-workers-lose-
historic-election-at-chattanooga-volkswagen-plant/?utm_term=.b17642fbe422. It is hard to 
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As its ranks continue to dwindle, the labor movement needs a spark, 
a rallying point, a triumph. It must organize a world-famous employer, and 
it must do so in the South. This article demonstrated that it is unlikely 
unions will be able to claim such a victory until the National Labor 
Relations Board rules that aggressive, anti-union community pressure is a 
violation of the laboratory conditions doctrine espoused over seventy years 
ago in General Shoe. The tactics deployed by anti-union politicians, 
business groups, and private interests in the elections at Nissan’s and 
Volkswagen’s plants undeniably created an atmosphere that rendered free 
choice impossible for the employees involved, and such parties are 
encouraged to utilize the same strategy at the next major battles for foreign 
manufacturers’ workplaces until labor law holds them accountable.    
 
                                                                                                                                         
see what made this election more historic than, say, the same union’s organizing effort at 
Nissan’s Smyrna, Tennessee plant in the late 1980s. 
